

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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P 291651Z SEP 75

FM USDEL USSCC GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 158

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USSCC GENEVA 0379

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SCC-VII-COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 29,
1975 RE ABM PROCEDURES (SCC-VII-009)

FOLLOWING IS GRAYGEAL'S STATEMENT AT SCC-VII MEETING,
SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 RE ABM PROCEDURES:

I

MR. COMMISSIONER, THE U.S. SIDE HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED
THE JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT PREPARED DURING OUR LAST SESSION
BY THE ABM PROCEDURES WORKING GROUP, AND CONSIDERS IT A GOOD
BASIS FOR CONTINUING OUR WORK. TODAY, I WILL OUTLINE
THE U.S. APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE ISSUES REFLECTED IN
THAT DOCUMENT, AND TO WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE,
VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS
AND THEIR COMPONENTS.

II

IN THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTION OF THE JOINT WORKING
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DOCUMENT, THE ISSUES CONCERN:

--INCLUSION OF PROVISIONS STATING THE PRINCIPLE OF
"POINTS-IN-TIME" WHEN ABM COMPONENTS WILL OR WILL
NOT BE COUNTED,

--INCLUSION OF A PROVISION STATING THE PRINCIPLE
CONCERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES
IN THE CASE WHERE A REPLACEMENT COMPONENT OF AN ABM
SYSTEM IS DEPLOYED AT THE PRECISE LOCATION OF
THE COMPONENT BEING REPLACED,

--NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS.

THE U.S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
INCLUDE GENERAL PROVISIONS WHICH STATE THE PRINCIPLE THAT
SELECTED LEVELS OF CONSTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OR DESTRUC-
TION WILL BE USED AS POINTS IN TIME TO DETERMINE WHEN A
REPLACEMENT COMPONENT COUNTS TOWARD THE NUMBER OF THAT TYPE
COMPONENT PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY AND WHEN THE REPLACED
COMPONENT NO LONGER COUNTS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS IS AN
IMPORTANT APPROACH WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO WORKING OUT
EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES WHICH ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE ABM TREATY AND WITH THE
PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY.

THE U.S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO INCLUDE
A PROVISION WHICH CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT WHEN AN ABM COMPO-
NENT IS DEPLOYED AT THE PRECISE LOCATION OF THE COMPONENT
BEING REPLACED, SO THAT REMOVAL OR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION
OF THE COMPONENT BEING REPLACED IS A NECESSARY PART OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OR INSTALLATION OF THE REPLACEMENT COMPONENT,
DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES SHALL BE AT THE DIS-
CRETION OF THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE REPLACEMENT. NEITHER
SIDE WISHES TO CONSTRAIN PERMITTED MODERNIZATION AND REPLACE-
MENT OF ABM COMPONENTS, WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE AT THE PRECISE
LOCATION OF THE OLD COMPONENTS. TH U.S. SIDE BELIEVES,
HOWEVER, THAT THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION WHICH CLEARLY
ADDRESSES THIS POSSIBILITY IS REQUIRED AND WOULD REDUCE THE
POSSIBILITY OF AMBIGUITIES ARISING IN THE FUTURE.

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WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS, THE U.S. VIEW
IS THAT THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES PREVIOUSLY AGREED REMAIN
VALID, BUT LACK THE SCOPE AND DETAIL NEEDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT
OF UNIQUE ASPECTS ASSOCIATED WITH REPLACEMENT AT CURRENT
DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND IN THE EXCHANGE OF DEPLOYMENT AREAS.
SPECIFICALLY, THE U.S. SIDE BELIEVES THAT NOTIFICATION
SHOULD INCLUDE THE LOCATION OF THE REPLACEMENT COMPONENT
AND THE COMPONENT BEING REPLACED, THE TYPES OF RADAR, THE

MONTH IN WHICH REPLACEMENT WAS INITIATED, AND THE MONTH IN WHICH IT WAS COMPLETED. IN THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS WE BELIEVE THAT THE LOCATION OF THE NEW DEPLOYMENT AREA SHOULD BE GIVEN IN THE SCC ALONG WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO EXCHANGE THE ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND UNCERTAINTIES MIGHT ARISE WHEN THE REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES ARE USED BY EITHER SIDE.

III

IN THE SECTION COVERING ABM LAUNCHERS THE ISSUES CONCERN:

--POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF DEFINITIONS OF "INITIATION OF CONSTRUCTION", AND

--THE EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION TO BE REQUIRED ON SILO LAUNCHERS.

THE U.S. SIDE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT USE OF THE TERM "INITIATION OF CONSTRUCTION" IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE II OF THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT THE POINTS IN TIME WHEN A COMPONENT SHALL COUNT UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE ABM TREATY CAN BE ADEQUATELY SPECIFIED WITHOUT PROVIDING A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT AND POSSIBLY CONFUSING DEFINITIONS OF THIS TERM.

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IN REGARD TO THE EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ABM SILO LAUNCHERS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL PROVIDES THE TYPE AND EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE AGREED REACTIVATION TIME CRITERION, AND THAT SUCH DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION WOULD BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

IV

IN THE SECTION ON ABM RADARS, THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT TO DEFINE "INITIATION OF CONSTRUCTION" ALSO APPEARS; IN ADDITION, THERE ARE ISSUES INVOLVING:

--CLASSIFICATION OF ABM RADARS BY TYPE, AND

--THE EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION TO BE REQUIRED ON ABM RADARS.

IT WOULD APPEAR LOGICAL THAT IN ORDER TO WORK OUT EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, THE COMPONENTS TO BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED SHOULD BE CATEGORIZED IN TERMS OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WERE CONSTRUCTED. THE SECRET

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TYPE AND EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE AGREED REACTIVATION TIME CRITERION WILL VARY, NOT ACCORDING TO THE POTENTIAL OF THE RADAR, BUT ACCORDING TO THE SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE STRUCTURE USED TO HOUSE OR MOUNT THE RADIATING ELEMENTS.

WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. METHOD FOR CLASSIFYING ABM RADARS FACILITATES THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE EXTENT OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION FOR ALL ABM RADARS. THE RESULTANT DETAILED US PROCEDURES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ABM RADARS ARE CLEAR, VERIFIABLE, AND SATISFY THE REACTIVATION TIME CRITERION OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS.

V

IN THE SECTION ON EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS, THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES CONCERN:

--THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERMITTED CONSTRUCTION OF COMPONENTS IN THE NEW AREA AND REQUIRED DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF COMPONENTS IN THE OLD AREA,

--THE RETENTION OF NON-PHASED-ARRAY ABM RADARS, OPERATIONAL ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE ABM TREATY AND LOCATED IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL DEPLOYMENT AREA.

THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS IS DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE TIME WHEN A SIDE EXCHANGING ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS IS WITHOUT THE ABM DEFENSES PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ALLOWING ALL COMPONENTS IN THE OLD DEPLOYMENT AREA TO REMAIN OPERATIONAL WHILE PERMITTING CONSTRUCTION UP TO AN AGREED STAGE TO PROCEED IN THE NEW DEPLOYMENT AREA ON ALL COMPONENTS ALLOWED UNDER THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE III OF THE ABM TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS ABM DEFENSES IN TWO AREAS BY REQUIRING THE INITIATION OF DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ON ALL ABM COMPONENTS OF A TYPE (LAUNCHERS OR RADARS) IN THE OLD DEPLOYMENT AREA BEFORE CONSTRUCTION OF A COMPONENT

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OF THAT TYPE IN THE NEW DEPLOYMENT AREA COULD PROCEED BEYOND THE AGREED STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD INSURE THAT THE LIMITS OF THE ABM TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL ARE NOT EXCEEDED DURING THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS AS A RESULT OF OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY, AND THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTING THESE PROCEDURES.

THE OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUE IN THIS SECTION OF THE JOINT WORKING DOCUMENT CONCERNS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NON-PHASED-ARRAY ABM RADARS, OPERATIONAL ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE ABM TREATY AND LOCATED IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL DEPLOYMENT AREA, BE RETAINED IN THE EVENT THAT ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS ARE EXCHANGED. IN THE U.S. VIEW THIS PROVISION, WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO RETAIN ABM COMPONENTS IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA AFTER IT HAD COMPLETED THE EXCHANGE OF ABM DEPLOYMENT AREAS, IS CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROTOCOL TO THE ABM TREATY.

VI

IN REGARD TO THE LEGAL FORM OF THE DOCUMENT, THE U.S. PROPOSED IN SCC-VI THAT THERE BE AN AMENDMENT TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES MODIFYING THE ATTACHMENT THERETO SO THAT THE REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES WOULD BECOME SECTION III OF THE AMENDED ATTACHMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED THAT THE PROCEDURES BE MADE A SECOND ATTACHMENT TO THE PROTOCOL. UNDER EITHER APPROACH, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE BASIC PROTOCOL ON PRO-

CEDURES WILL HAVE TO BE AMENDED TO REFER TO THE PROTOCOL TO
THE ABM TREATY.

VII

MR. COMMISSIONER, THE U.S. COMPONENT OF THE SCC IS PRE-
PARED TO WORK TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF PRODUCING A JOINT DRAFT
TEXT, AD REFERENDUM TO GOVERNMENTS, CONTAINING THE ABM
REPLACEMENT PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND ITS
PROTOCOL. WE HAVE AGREED THAT A WORKING GROUP WILL BE CON-
VENED TO CONTINUE WORKING OUT THESE PROCEDURES. I BELIEVE
THAT THE MATERIAL PRESENTED BY BOTH COMPONENTS OF
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THE SCC PROVIDE USEFUL INPUTS FOR THIS ABM PROCEDURES
WORKING GROUP.GRAYBEAL

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